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*Justice, Supreme Court of Ohio, 1985-2002 (ret.); Executive Director, Ohio Civil Service 
Employees Association. This Article is based on a lecture delivered at the Cleveland State 
University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, on September 25, 2006.  While I recognize 
my responsibility to give you a fair and balanced perspective, I respectfully ask that you 
remember that I now represent a partisan point of view with regard to the right of public 
employees to have the statutory right to bargain collectively to reach their just goals.  I work 
for a 30 person board.  The Ohio Civil Service Employees Association is a union representing 
all the state employees (nearly 37,000 state employees) and it is my job to look after them and 
their needs, negotiate their contracts, and to be sure that the contract is adhered to by the 
management of the state.  Having said that, I hasten to add that my feelings and perspective 
have not much changed given the background from which I came and the actual experiences I 
have had.  Accordingly, it is my hope that after reading this Article, based upon an 
academically defensible presentation, you will draw the conclusion that collective bargaining 
for employees in the public sector is a good thing and should be protected at all costs in and by 
the law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 1, 1979, nearly 3,700 city employees walked off their jobs in Toledo, 
Ohio.1 Among the striking workers were over 700 policemen and 500 fire fighters–
the vast majority of these forces. With this strike, essential city services quickly 
came to a halt. For practical purposes, there were no police officers to patrol the 
streets, no fire fighters to respond to fire alarms, no sanitation crews, no drawbridge 
operators or even welfare personnel to serve the citizens in a city of over a third of a 
million people.  During the next three days, the citizens of Toledo—the community 
where I was then serving as a city councilperson—literally feared for the loss of their 
homes, their personal property and even their lives as the protections of society, 
expected of a government by its citizens, crumbled around them.2  
Before the strike was settled, many homes and businesses burned, defying the 
desperate efforts of civilian brigades and neighbors armed with little more than 
garden hoses to extinguish the blazes.  Stores were looted by roving, and sometimes 
armed gangs, fortified with the knowledge that no patrol car would respond to the 
alarms.  Citizens prepared to defend their homes and other property by whatever 
means were available as each nightfall approached. 
The threat was real, not imagined. As the 203nd anniversary of the Declaration of 
Independence approached, the right of the people to be secure in their homes was 
being severely challenged.  As the sky literally filled with smoke, my city was taking 
on the pall of a chaotic, war-torn metropolis.  Toledo seemed to be consuming itself 
as we intensified our efforts to end the strike of our public employees. 
Leaders of the city employees’ unions had invoked the strike sanction when 
negotiations with the city had reached an impasse.  Negotiations aimed at reaching a 
contract settlement had started weeks before but the bargaining was unfruitful and no 
settlement was reached.  The employees were adamant in their demands for higher 
wages and additional benefits; however, the demands far exceeded the city’s ability 
to pay.  This was so no matter how deserving or otherwise reasonable the demands 
were.  Most painful of all, upon reaching impasse, the law—which we all depend on 
to guide us in our everyday affairs—did not provide a viable means of dispute 
                                                                
1See, e.g., Toledo Workers Strike, WASH. POST, July 2, 1979, at A5.   
2I specifically remember sitting in a hotel room at 2:30 in the morning, looking out the 
window from the eighth floor.  I saw the full block on my right on fire and the full block on 
my left on fire.  Young hoodlums were throwing concrete blocks through glass block windows 
and carrying out TVs.  I had no firemen to send and no policeman to send.  At 2:30 that 
morning, a note was passed to me that said, “Councilman, a public transportation bus driver 
just had his brains blown out in front of one of the major restaurants in Toledo”; I didn’t even 
have a detective to send to investigate it.   
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol55/iss1/3
2007] PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEE BARGAINING 3 
resolution.  With growing frustration and discontent, the unionized city employees 
saw no alternative but to strike.  
As the strike slipped into its second and then third day, we were faced with 
seemingly untenable choices.  Even though negotiations continued, there was no 
progress or settlement in sight.  The law then in effect, the Ferguson Act (which 
regulated concerted action of governmental employees), provided the city council 
and the city manager with the option of firing all of the striking employees.3  
However, this provision, even then an archaic remnant of a bygone era, was certainly 
no meaningful solution at all.  Who would have replaced all of the dismissed 
workers?  Where would a city, overnight, find 1,200 trained policemen and firemen 
to protect its citizens?  This is to say nothing of the other city employees in critical 
service positions.4  If the discharge sanction of the Ferguson Act were invoked and 
the decision was subsequently made to rehire the fired workers, such rehired 
employees would have been precluded from receiving any benefits of a new 
employment agreement.  Even if it had been practical, a mass firing would have only 
served to exacerbate the confrontation rather than to bring about a reduction of the 
dispute.  Finally, facing a management threat to restore order through the use of the 
National Guard, the union employees responded to a court order.  A widely respected 
judge of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas ended the strike by ordering the 
workers to return to their jobs under threat of stiff penalties and sanctions.5 
The end of this bitter strike did not, of course, mark the first nor the last public 
employee unrest in this state.  A similarly destructive strike took place in Dayton in 
1977.6  Less drastic, but equally significant, strikes and work slow-downs such as the 
“blue flu” had become commonplace.7  Between 1973 and 1980, across Ohio there 
were 428 public employee labor actions.  In the face of such labor unrest, coupled 
with changing times and changing attitudes, the lawmakers of Ohio began to 
recognize the desperate need of the state’s public employees to be granted the right 
to bargain collectively with their employers.  It is my hope that after reading this 
Article, based upon an academically defensible presentation, you will draw the 
conclusion that collective bargaining for employees in the public sector is a good 
thing and should be protected at all costs in and by the law. 
                                                                
3Ferguson Act of 1947, No. 148, 1947 Ohio Laws 449 (repealed 1983). 
4Drawbridge operators, for instance, left the drawbridges over the river up and walked off 
their jobs. 
5See, e.g., Cities Grapple with Strikes, WASH. POST, July 3, 1979, at A7; Toledo Firemen 
Reject City Offer, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1979, at A12; Toledo Workers Get Pact; Possibility of 
Layoffs Seen, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1979, at A8. 
6See, e.g., Dayton Homes, Apartments Burn as City’s Firemen Continue Strike, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 10, 1977, at A6; Dayton Firemen End Strike, but the Rekindled Issue Lingers, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 1977, at A4.   
7See, e.g., Auto Walkout, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1980, at C2; Sixteen Teachers who 
Violated a Court Order to Return to Work During a Strike Against the Boardman School 
District Went to Jail, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 1980, at A9; Johns-Manville Strike in Ohio is 
Ended, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1977; Steel Haulers’ Strike Sparks Violence, WASH. POST, Nov. 
15, 1978, at A7; Tomato Pickers March, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1978, at A15. 
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II. HISTORY OF PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
Collective bargaining for public employees has traveled a torturous road in Ohio.  
For years the courts had no legislative direction or statutory framework by which to 
be guided in determining public sector labor relations cases.  Conflicts were dealt 
with on an ad hoc basis.  With no guiding principles upon which employers and 
employees could structure their conduct, litigation and controversy were abundant. 
A. Hagerman v. City of Dayton 
Much of the public sector labor conflict arose out of the seminal case of 
Hagerman v. City of Dayton8 handed down by the Ohio Supreme Court in 1947.  The 
court, obviously opposed to the notion of public-sector bargaining, opined that “labor 
unions have no function which they may discharge in connection with civil service 
appointees.”9  The court supported this ruling by noting that  
[t]he laws of this state . . . and the valid ordinances of the particular 
municipality cover fully all questions of wages, hours of work and 
conditions of employment affecting civil service appointees. . . . The law 
provides for the election and appointment of officials whose duties would 
be interfered with by the intrusion of outside organizations.10 
B. Subsequent Intermediate Appellate Court Decisions 
Then in 1970,11 197312 and 1974,13 several Courts of Appeals began to move 
away from the absolutist holding of Hagerman.14  In North Royalton Education 
Association v. North Royalton Board of Education, the Court clearly rejected 
(without authority to do so, of course) the Hagerman holding.15  The Court permitted 
a school board to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with a teachers’ 
association in situations where there was no statutory provision prohibiting such 
action.  
C. Dayton Classroom Teachers Association v. Dayton Board of Education 
In 1975, the Ohio Supreme Court itself softened the position the Court had taken 
in Hagerman.  Without even pausing to note or distinguish that landmark case, the 
Court ruled that a school board had the discretionary authority to enter into a 
collective bargaining agreement so long as the agreement did not abrogate the duties 
                                                                
8Hagerman v. City of Dayton, 71 N.E.2d 246 (Ohio 1947). 
9Id. at 254.  
10Id. 
11Foltz v. City of Dayton, 272 N.E.2d 169 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970). 
12Youngstown Educ. Ass’n v. Youngstown City Bd. of Educ., 301 N.E.2d 891 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1973). 
13North Royalton Educ. Ass’n v. North Royalton Bd. of Educ., 325 N.E.2d 901 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1974). 
14Hagerman, 71 N.E.2d. 246.  
15North Royalton Educ. Ass’n, 325 N.E.2d. 901.   
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and responsibilities imposed on the board by law.16  Even with this decision, 
mandatory collective bargaining was still not in the picture.  Thus, the illegal strikes 
continued.  
D. The Ferguson Act 
Concurrent to these developments in the courts, the state legislature was also 
addressing the public-sector bargaining issue.  In 1947, the same year that the Ohio 
Supreme Court decided the Hagerman case, the legislature enacted the Ferguson 
Act.17  Unequivocally, the Act prohibited public employees from striking.18  
Employees who did strike were subject to disciplinary action, including dismissal.19  
Although a fired employee could be immediately rehired under the provisions of the 
Act,20 such a rehired employee could not be rehired at a higher rate of pay,21 was not 
eligible for any pay raises for at least one year,22 and continued employment was 
subject to completion of a two-year probationary period during which time the 
employee served at the pleasure of the appointing authority.23 
E. Public Sector Labor Relations Legislation 
With the Ferguson Act clearly prohibiting strikes by public employees, 
employees were without one of the most important bargaining tools available to their 
counterparts in the private sector—the right to strike is, of course, the ultimate 
weapon.  Although during the 1960’s and the 1970’s, the legislature and the courts 
had come to implicitly recognize the role of unions in public-sector bargaining, 
significant reform was still needed. 
1.  The First Attempt at Legislation (1971) 
In 1971, the first comprehensive public-sector labor relations legislation was 
introduced in the General Assembly.24  Although the bill had the support of 
Governor John J. Gilligan, it languished in, and was never voted out of, the 
Committee on Agriculture, Commerce and Labor. 
2. Public Employee Bargaining Bill (1975) 
In 1975, a comprehensive public employee bargaining bill passed both houses of 
the state legislature.25  Governor James Rhodes strenuously objected to an arbitration 
                                                                
16Dayton Classroom Teachers Ass’n v. Dayton Bd. of Educ, 323 N.E.2d 714 (Ohio 1975).   
17Ferguson Act of 1947, No. 148, 1947 Ohio Laws 449 (repealed 1983); See also S. 261, 
97th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., Ohio S.J. 281 (Ohio 1947).   
18§ 2.  
19§ 4. 
20§ 5.  
21§ 5(a).  
22§ 5(b).  
23§ 5(c).  
24H.R. 881, 109th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., 134 Ohio H.J. 348 (1971). 
25See S. 70, 111th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., 136 Ohio S.J. 1179 (1975). 
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provision of the bill that would have vested arbitrators with authority to make final 
awards binding on public employers.  Governor Rhodes vetoed the bill, and an 
attempt to override the veto failed.26  
3. Public Employee Bargaining Bill (1977) 
In 1977, after slight modifications, a similar bill was again presented to the 
Governor.27  This effort to gain legislative recognition of the bargaining rights for 
public employees also failed when Governor Rhodes, again, vetoed the bill.  Thus, 
there was no recognition for the bargaining rights for public employees.  
F. Public Employees’ Collective Bargaining Act 
In January of 1983, following the election of November 1982, a new legislature 
and a new governor, Richard F. Celeste, took office.28  Governor Celeste had 
promised during his campaign for governor that, if he were elected, a bargaining bill 
for public employees would be passed and that he would sign the legislation.  
Governor Celeste promptly made good on his campaign promise. 
In March of 1983, Senate Bill 133 was introduced.29  The bill, with minor 
changes, rapidly cleared the Senate.  By the end of March, an amended version of the 
legislation had been passed by the House.  On that same day, the Senate approved 
the House version, and on July 6, 1983, Governor Celeste signed the bill into law.30  
When that new law took effect, nearly 580,000 public employees of Ohio were 
finally granted the statutory right to organize, join a labor organization, and bargain 
collectively with their public employers without fear of dismissal or sanction.  With 
passage of the Public Employees’ Collective Bargaining Act (the Act) (as the new 
legislation was to be known) and the repeal of the hated Ferguson act, Ohio joined 
thirty-nine other states in recognizing the rights of its public employees to seek from 
public employers suitable agreements governing nearly all aspects of employment. 
The Act is comprehensive in nature. In the first section, the legislature includes 
an extensive list of the terms, setting forth the respective definitions that are to be 
applied throughout the Act.31  A state employment relations board (SERB) with 
attendant duties, rights and responsibilities is created.32  The rights of the employees, 
33including a list of those subjects appropriate for collective bargaining, are 
                                                                
26I debated this issue with Governor Rhodes (it seemed like endlessly) for hours while 
riding in the back of the vans that we used to campaign in, with him eating peanuts and 
listening to why collective bargaining was so necessary. 
27S. 222, 112th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., 137 Ohio S.J. 312 (1977). 
28If this Article has been uninteresting to the reader up to this point, this is where it 
certainly became interesting to me as I prepared, remembering the history that I lived during 
this period of time. 
29S. 133, 115th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., 140 Ohio S.J. 164 (Ohio 1983). 
30Public Employee’s Collective Bargaining Act, No. 40, 1983 Laws of Ohio 336 (1983) 
(codified as amended at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.01-.24 (LexisNexis 2007)). 
31§ 4117.01.  
32§ 4117.02. 
33§ 4117.03. 
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enumerated.34  Terms of the agreements,35 grievance and arbitration procedures,36 
and unfair labor practice37 and dispute settlement mechanisms38 all find a favored 
place in the Act.  Importantly, the dispute settlement procedure for situations when 
the parties are unable to reach an agreement is exhaustively detailed.39  In the event 
that the procedures prove unsuccessful, public employees, other than policemen, fire 
fighters and other emergency safety personnel, are given the right to strike.40  
Although safety personnel are prohibited from striking, resolution procedures for an 
impasse between those forces and the public employer are in fact provided in the 
act.41  
G. Case Law  
After the passage of the Act, the cases challenging the law, and specific 
provisions thereof, were filed and began working their way to the Ohio Supreme 
Court.  When the cases arrived, I was privileged to be a member of that Court, 
having been elected in November of 1984. 
1. Dayton Fraternal Order of Police 
In the first case, Dayton Fraternal Order of Police v. State Employment Relations 
Board (which I wrote), we held that the Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act 
is “a law of general nature,” and, as such, the law has “uniform operation throughout 
the state.”42  This is because all of the attacks across the state argued that the law was 
not a law of general nature.  Well, it clearly is under Article II, section 34 of the Ohio 
Constitution.  
2. Mahoning County Board of Mental Retardation 
Next, in a Mahoning County case, the Court moved to dispel any doubt as to the 
propriety or enforceability of collective bargaining agreements between public 
employers and employees.43  In response to an argument that public employers were 
somehow less constrained by their employment contract than were their private-
sector counterparts, the court held that “negotiated collective bargaining agreements 
are just as binding upon public employers as they are upon private employers.”44 
                                                                
34§ 4117.08. 
35§ 4117.10.   
36Id.  
37§ 4117.11. 
38§ 4117.14. 
39§ 4117.14. 
40§ 4117.15, .16.  
41§ 4117.16(B).  
42State ex rel. Dayton Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 44 v. State Employment 
Relations Bd., 488 N.E.2d 181, 187 (Ohio 1986). 
43Mahoning County Bd. of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities v. 
Mahoning County TMR Educ. Assn., 488 N.E.2d 872 (Ohio 1986). 
44Id. at 876. 
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3. City of Kettering 
Then in late 1986, the Court heard and decided City of Kettering v. State 
Employment Relations Board.45  This case was hailed as a fight for survival of 
public-employee bargaining rights.46  In Kettering, the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of a section of the Act that was challenged as being in violation of 
the constitutional home-rule provision of municipalities.47  
4. The Rocky River Cases 
This was the case law precedent when City of Rocky River v. State Employment 
Relations Board came to the Court in 1988.48  The case involved fire fighters in the 
City of Rocky River.  Negotiations with the City had reached an impasse.  Pursuant 
to the law, a fact-finder came in, heard both sides and issued his report.  The City 
rejected the report, triggering the binding final offer arbitration provision of the Act.  
The City took the position that it would not accept any “binding mandate” because 
the City, through its representatives, contended there were “constitutional 
infirmities” with the conciliation process.49  
This next point is, I believe, both interesting and important.  Between the time 
Kettering50 was decided by the Court in 1986—totally upholding the collective 
bargaining law—and Rocky River51 arrived in 1988, there had been an election.  At 
the 1986 election, Chief Justice Celebrezze was replaced by Chief Justice Moyer.  
Now (instead of me having 4 votes) Justices Locher, Holmes and Wright had their 
fourth vote, and after a very heated internal battle, this Court majority held that the 
conciliation section52 was unconstitutional.53  Clearly it was the prelude for the whole 
act to be found unconstitutional in the next cases to come.  Notwithstanding the 
Court’s prior case law, this, many of us believed, was the beginning of the end of the 
Collective Bargaining Law. 
Then another interesting thing happened.  Again it was an election.  In 1988, 
Justice Locher retired, and Justice Resnick was elected to replace him.  Through a 
number of procedural maneuverings, and I plead guilty to being the mover, we kept 
the Rocky River case alive so that “Rocky River I”54 was then followed by “Rocky 
                                                                
45City of Kettering v. State of Employment Relations Bd., 496 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio 1986). 
46As we explained, the city’s “position ha[d] the potential to dismantle the collective 
bargaining rights granted to municipal employees and in large measure could defeat the 
laudable purposes of the Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act.” Id. at 985. 
47Id. at 987-88. 
48Rocky River v. State Employment Relations Bd. (Rocky I), 530 N.E.2d 1 (Ohio 1988).  
This is where it, again, becomes particularly interesting to me recalling this history.   
49Id. at 2.  
50Kettering, 496 N.E.2d 983.  
51Rocky River, 530 N.E.2d 1.  
52OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(I) (LexisNexis 2007). 
53Rocky River, 530 N.E.2d at 9.  
54Rocky River, 530 N.E.2d 1.  
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River II”55 and then (we affectionately called it) “Rocky III.”56  Early in 1989, just 
after Justice Resnick arrived, we reconsidered or reheard Rocky River I, and I wrote 
what is now known as “Rocky IV.”57  The holding was intentionally made broad 
because I wanted no mistakes this time.  Thus, “the Ohio Public Employees’ 
Collective Bargaining Act, [Ohio Revised Code Ann. §] 4117, and specifically [Ohio 
Revised Code Ann. §] 4117.14(I), are constitutional as they fall within the General 
Assembly’s authority to enact employee welfare legislation pursuant to Section 34, 
Article II of the Ohio Constitution.”58  We went on to say that the home-rule 
provision of the Ohio Constitution “may not be interposed to impair, limit or negate 
the Act.”59  This leads us to where we are today.  
III. CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS 
A.  How and When Conducted 
Today we have contact negotiations.  The Public Employees Collective 
Bargaining Act provides for recognized organizations60 such as my organization, the 
Ohio Civil Service Employees Association (OCSEA), an affiliate of the American 
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME).61  We are 
recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent for all unionized state employees other 
than some of the health care workers and police officers.  As the executive director 
of that group, it is my job to negotiate, as the chief spokesperson, the contract for all 
those employees.62  We then enter into collective bargaining.63  We have a 21 person 
bargaining team that sits on one side, and the management sits on the other.  We 
argue across the table, debate, and hope we can reach a conclusion.  So the 
governmental unit, whatever it might be, generally has a recognized bargaining 
agent, and these are the people who end up negotiating these contracts.   
Our current contract is very sizable.  I have gone over every word and every page 
in this contract because it is amazing how words can be twisted—as lawyers we 
                                                                
55Rocky River v. State Employment Relations Bd. (Rocky II), 533 N.E.2d 270 (Ohio 
1988). 
56Rocky River v. State Employment Relations Bd. (Rocky III), 535 N.E.2d 657 (Ohio 
1989). 
57Rocky River v. State Employment Relations Bd. (Rocky IV), 539 N.E.2d 103 (Ohio 
1989).  
58Id. at 119-20. 
59Id. at 120. 
60See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.03-.06 (LexisNexis 2007). 
61See Ohio Civil Service Employees Association, About Us, http://www.ocsea.org/ 
myocsea/aboutus/default.asp (Last Visited May 1, 2007).  
62On the other side happens to be a lawyer from Cleveland that Bob Taft paid $360,000 to 
negotiate our contract and several other contracts. 
63This is what goes on all over the state (only on a far smaller scale) in Toledo, Cleveland, 
or wherever it might be. 
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know this—and one has to watch what happens.64 We began negotiating this contract 
early in December 2005 and finally concluded it just before March 1, 2006, when it 
went into effect.   
B.  Negotiating the Current Contract 
I will expand upon the kinds of incidents that occur during negotiations.  Some 
might say I’m telling stories out of school; but this is what happened, cold, 
unvarnished, and straight to the point.  I was in the middle of negotiating this 
contract.  I had my bargaining team, and I was moving them step-by-step to a 
conclusion.  All of the preliminaries had gone on, and I finally was getting them to 
the point where we were going to say “yes” to a particular proposal.  The fact finder, 
Dr. Harry Graham, and I had met, and we had spent a considerable amount of time 
on it.  All of a sudden, while I am in front of my 21-member group and a whole 
assemblage of staff people, I felt a tap on my shoulder and looked around; it was Dr. 
Graham.  Harry said to me, “Andy, you gotta come out.”  I responded, “Dr. Graham, 
don’t you see that I’m busy?  I have been working on this for four months, I finally 
have them to the point where they are ready to say yes or no, and we are going to 
decide upon this thing.”  “You’ve gotta come out,” said Graham, “the governor’s on 
the phone.”  I said, “I don’t want to talk to the governor; he’s got a lawyer, he 
doesn’t need me, and besides that, he and I are going to think differently about this.”  
He said, “No, you’ve gotta come out, and bring the president.”  So I got the president 
of the union, the vice president, and the secretary-treasurer.  The president and I went 
into a room (they prohibited the secretary-treasurer and the vice president from being 
in the room), and the governor and/or his chief of staff were on the phone, and they 
said “Well, we’re not going to give you what you’ve been asking for, but we can do 
it a different way.  We’ll agree to your demand.”  They were giving us one, one, and 
one percent for each of the three years, and my bottom line was double digits over 
three years.  I knew exactly where the state was hiding the money because, as a 
councilman for the city of Toledo, I used to hide money.  I had laid that all out for 
Dr. Graham, and so we were moving in the right direction; we had it done, and the 
governor, through his chief of staff, said “Ok. We’ll settle everything else, take the 
wages to fact-finding, we’ll nod to the fact finder to give you what you want, and 
it’ll be over.”  I thought about that for a little while, walked out of the room, and I 
said, “Let me think about this.”   
I went to the lawyer on the other side and I said “You know, I don’t think that’s 
ethical.”  I said, “We have the case decided between us, the judge knew what the 
decision was going to be, and you want me to stand up and argue—put on a show for 
my people—that in fact this case hasn’t been decided.”  I said, “I don’t think that’s 
ethical, and I don’t want to do it.”  My counterpart explained, “We do it all the time.”  
I said, “Well, you’re not doing it this time, and I want you to know I called 
disciplinary council.”  “You did what?”  I said, “Yes, I called disciplinary council, 
and he doesn’t think it is very ethical either.”  I finally agreed to submit the case on 
briefs, which we did, and avoided the oral argument.  This is the kind of thing one 
goes through in negotiations.   
                                                                
64CONTRACT BETWEEN THE STATE OF OHIO AND THE OHIO CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
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Toolbox/files/Contract_2006.pdf [hereinafter 2006-09 CONTRACT]. 
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C.  Fact Finding 
Now I will illustrate some other things.  I mentioned fact finding.  Here is how it 
works.  Article 26 of our contract, which deals with “Holidays,” is an example of the 
kind of thing that can be tried.  In our previous contract, section “26.03 - Eligibility 
for holiday pay,” read as follows: “Employees who are scheduled to work and call 
off sick the day of a holiday shall forfeit their right to holiday pay for that day.”65  
That seemed, to me, to be very unfair.  What if an employee was scheduled to work 
on a holiday, suddenly had an attack of appendicitis, and was in the hospital on the 
operating table having his or her appendix removed?  They were not going to be paid 
holiday pay.  I would not settle for that section.  I wanted the contract to include a 
provision whereby employees would get their holiday pay if there are extenuating 
circumstances that can be shown.  The management finally agreed but also wanted 
additional language.  Some of our people (and we have experts in this contract—
37,000 people who, as you can imagine, know the contract as well as I know it) say 
“Oh, holiday.  Labor Day is on Monday.  Fine, I think I just won’t come in the 
Friday before, or I’ll take Tuesday off and I’ll have a long vacation.”  Thus, the 
management decided that they wanted to do something about this.  I sent this matter 
off to a subcommittee—all I wanted was the “extenuating circumstances.”  In the 
new contract, 26.03 is now numbered 26.04 and reads as follows: “Employees who 
are scheduled to work and call off sick the day before, the day of, or the day after a 
holiday shall forfeit their right to holiday pay for that day, unless there is 
documented extenuating circumstances which prohibit the employee from reporting 
for duty.”66  It is the last part that I wanted included, but the state wanted the “day 
before” and “day after a holiday” language to be sure that everybody showed up for 
work.  Well, what’s the day before Monday?  Sunday, obviously.  The literal 
language there says “the day before” and “the day after.”  “Oh no,” said the 
management, “We don’t mean that, we mean their last scheduled work day.”  Thus, 
people who choose to read the contract literally call off on Friday and are, thus, off 
on Friday, Saturday, Sunday, and Monday.   
This matter is going to arbitration shortly.  One well known legal postulate is that 
the language is construed against the drafter.67  Thus, I will be arguing this to the 
arbitrator, because the management drafted that language, and everyone in their right 
mind in this room knows that the day before Monday is Sunday, not Friday.  So, this 
is the kind of thing that happens with the contract and illustrates why the act was so 
important: to provide a mechanism for us to settle these kinds of problems. 
IV. HOW TENUOUS THE SURVIVAL CORD 
A.  Ohio Revised Code Section 4117.01(C) 
Another challenge that occurs with public employee collective bargaining 
involves insidious changes to statutory law.68  The first illustration is section 
                                                                
65CONTRACT BETWEEN THE STATE OF OHIO AND THE OHIO CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, MARCH 1, 2003–FEBRUARY 28, 2006 § 26.03 (2003). 
662006-09 CONTRACT, supra note 64, § 26.04. 
67See, e.g., 18 OH. JUR. 3D Contracts § 131 (2006). 
68I was on the other side for a long time so I recognize the tricks! 
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4117.01(C)69 of the Act, a section consisting of definitions.  An earlier version of this 
law explained that “‘[p]ublic employee’ means any person . . . except” eighteen 
specially excepted categories of individuals.70  (There were eighteen total 
subsections).71  A version of the Act from one year later looks the same, except for 
seventeen new words that were added under a brand new nineteenth subsection: 
“‘Public employee’ means any person except . . . (19) Employees who must be 
licensed to practice law in this state to perform their duties as employees.”72  
Individuals falling into this category were no longer public employees for purposes 
of collective bargaining.  This change in the law took 209 employees out of our 
bargaining unit.  Most of them were hearing officers for the industrial commission—
they were judges.  They make the decision at the first level as to whether or not 
someone is entitled to worker’s compensation.  The authority to appoint, hire, and 
fire these officers lies with a three person appointed board, the three person 
appointed board being appointed by the governor.  One can just imagine sitting as a 
hearing officer, hearing a serious case regarding an employee who has the right to 
worker’s compensation, and the boss standing in the back of the room, saying 
“You’re going to decide how?  Well, I’m gonna call the industrial commission!”  
They can then be fired by the industrial commission.   
We could not live with this situation.  I believe it was bad public policy.  By this 
point in time, I had already left the Court, and the union had come to me asking 
whether I saw any way around it.  After researching the issue, I found that it was a 
violation of the one subject rule.73  They had buried this provision in the middle of a 
bill that was hundreds of pages long.74  Thus, I prepared the lawsuit.  As a matter of 
courtesy, I delivered it to the Governor’s chief of staff, Brian Hicks, whom I had 
known for a long time.  I made an appointment, went in and said, “Brian, I’m here to 
tell you I’m going to sue you tomorrow.”  He said, “Well, that’s nice, why are you 
going to do that?”  And so I explained the situation to him, and he said, “Well, I did 
that.”  When I asked him why, his reason was that he is “philosophically opposed to 
lawyers being in a bargaining unit.”  This is how we made public policy in the State 
of Ohio (and that is why elections are very important).  So what happened in this 
case?  I had it held unconstitutional,75 and the court ordered all of these people—by 
this time 257 employees—back into the bargaining unit.  Then I negotiated a 
settlement, which became very expensive for the state.  I obtained a $200,000 check 
for the union for damages.  We’re all taxpayers, and I should apologize; but it did not 
bother me at all, frankly, to not only take all of these people back into the bargaining 
unit, but to get this check for damages.   
                                                                
69OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.01(C) (LexisNexis 2007). 
70Id. (Anderson 2003). 
71§ 4117.01(C)(1)-(18) (Anderson 2003). 
72§ 4117.01(C)(19) (LexisNexis 2004). 
73OHIO CONST. art. II, § 15(D). 
74H.R. 675, 124th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2002). 
75See State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Ohio State Governor, No. 04CVH02, 2005 WL 
3964730 (Ohio C.P. July 13, 2005).  
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B. Ohio Revised Code Section 4117.14(C) 
The story of section 4117.14(C)76 of the act is an example of the insidiousness 
that can be involved in these actions, and another example of why I am endeavoring 
to make an academically defensible plea—nonetheless, I feel quite strongly about it.  
Section 4117.14(C) reads as follows: “In the event the parties are unable to reach an 
agreement, they may submit, at any time prior to forty-five days before the 
expiration date of the collective bargaining agreement, [their] dispute to any 
mutually agreed upon settlement procedure . . . .”77  The settlement procedure 
happens to be the fact finding process.  The fact-finder is called in, makes a report, 
and the fact-finding panel has an obligation to submit it to the labor organization, in 
this case us, and to the legislative body.  Prior to amendment, section 
4117.14(C)(6)78 provided that “[n]ot later than seven days after the findings and 
recommendations are sent, the legislative body, by a three-fifths vote of its total 
membership, and in the case of the public employee organization, the membership, 
by a three-fifths vote of the total membership, may reject the recommendations.”  
Thus, we could reject, there will be no contract, and then would have the right to 
strike.  This has proven to be a very interesting provision, however.  Obviously, I 
know what three-fifths of the total membership is in my union, and I must get three-
fifths to reject.  When I helped write this act in some of its early stages, we built this 
provision in so we could prevent most public employee strikes; but we also wanted 
to provide a mechanism to settle the disputes.  What did they do here?  The 
interesting part of the language involves the words “three-fifths” of “the legislative 
body.”79  Few would not think that the legislative body of the state of Ohio is the 
General Assembly.  Obviously we know it is the General Assembly.  Guess what 
they did—in the amended version of this same statute, the language at the beginning 
of subsection C is the same;80 but 4117.14(C)(6) was, interestingly, divided into two 
subsections: (6)(a),81 which is the same as old subsection (6),82 and a new subsection 
(6)(b).83  And with another 22 well defined insidious words, they said: “As used in 
division (C)(6)(a) of this section, ‘legislative body’ means the controlling board 
when the state or any of its agencies, authorities, commissions, boards, or other 
branch of public employment is party to the fact-finding process.”84  Few people 
have heard of the controlling board.  The controlling board is 7 people. 85  All the 
                                                                
76§ 4117.14(C) (LexisNexis 2007).  
77Id.  
78§ 4117.14(C)(6) (Anderson 2003). 
79Id.  
80§ 4117.14(C) (LexisNexis 2004). 
81§ 4117.14(C)(6)(a) (LexisNexis 2004). 
82§ 4117.14(C)(6) (Anderson 2003). 
83§ 4117.14(C)(6)(b) (LexisNexis 2004). 
84Id.  
85See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 127.12 (LexisNexis 2007): 
There is hereby created a controlling board consisting of the director of budget and 
management or an employee of the office of budget and management designated by 
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management has to do is take the matter to the controlling board where they have 5 
votes, and 5 of 7 is the necessary three-fifths.  In arguing the case, I said to the judge, 
“That’s not the way the system is supposed to work; and besides, they didn’t follow 
the law because they didn’t follow the one subject rule.”  He said “I think that’s bad 
too,” and Judge Bessey threw this out too.86  Unfortunately, this provision is still in 
the law because they re-passed the section.87  I explain all of this to show what I 
believe is really important with regard to the act.   
V. CONCLUSION 
      I have endeavored to be objective in my presentation to you.  Just know, 
however, I am not a neutral on the subject of collective bargaining for public 
employees.  I am persuaded to my point of view not just because of my current 
vested interest, but also because I sincerely believe the Act to be good public policy, 
soundly supported by Constitutional dictates, and implemented by fair and balanced 
legislation. 
     Thomas Fuller, a seventeenth century English clergyman, once said: “Policy 
consists in serving God in such a manner as not to offend the devil.”88  I follow this 
admonition in my everyday work, and I have tried to follow it in this Article.  
                                                          
the director, the chairman of the finance-appropriations committee of the house of 
representatives, the chairman of the finance committee of the senate, two members of 
the house of representatives appointed by the speaker, one from the majority party and 
one from the minority party, and two members of the senate appointed by the 
president, one from the majority party and one from the minority party.  
Id. 
86See State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Ohio State Governor, No. 04CVH02, 2005 WL 
3964730 (Ohio C.P. July 13, 2005). 
87§ 4117.14(C)(6)(b) (LexisNexis 2007). 
88Thomas Fuller, quoted in THE INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THOUGHTS 562 (John P. 
Bradley et al. eds., J.G. Ferguson Publ’g Co. 1969). 
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